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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ON CROSS-APPEAL 
On January 1, 1991, Arrington Construction Company awarded 
Urethane the job of applying foam insulation and fire proofing on a 
project at the Idaho National Energy Laboratory in Scoville, Idaho 
("INEL Job"). (R. 3 90) 
John Arrington ("Arrington"), the president of Arrington 
Construction Company, advised Urethane that Arrington would need a 
Performance Bond and a Labor and Materials Bond to ensure Urethanefs 
performance of the contract. (R. 390) 
Urethanefs bonding agents required audited financial statements 
to issue a bond of the size required for the INEL job. Completing the 
financial statements would have taken several weeks and Urethane 
needed bonding immediately. (R. 390) 
Because Urethane's work on the INEL job was scheduled to begin 
before it could obtain the audited financial statement and because of 
Urethanefs financial condition, Ed Kendall decided to ask Utah Foam 
to provide bonding. (R. 390-391) 
On March 14, 1991 Urethane's president, Edward Kendall approached 
Utah Foam's president Bruce Wilson with an urgent matter relating to 
Urethane's attempts to obtain a large government construction contract 
called the INEL project in Idaho. Mr. Kendall told both Mr. Wilson 
and a bonding agent, Mr. Westover, that Urethane would lose the INEL 
contract unless Urethane immediately secured bonding. (R. 324, R. 
341-42) 
In his deposition testimony, Mr. Kendall admitted: 
1 
Q: When you went into discuss this bonding matter with 
Mr. Wilson, you were under some time pressure to 
obtain a bond at that point; is that correct? 
A: Yes it was. 
Q: Did you tell him you might lose the job if you didn't 
obtain the bond? 
A: I did. I told them that there was a possibility that 
we would lose the iob if we didn't obtain the bond and 
we needed -- and at that point we needed the bond 
virtually immediately. (Emphasis added) 
(R. 322) 
John Arrington, the general contractor on the INEL project, told 
Mr. Kendall that: "if Urethane did not provide a bond," Arrington 
would: "start looking for another contractor." (R. 3 52-54) As a 
result of Mr. Kendall's urgent plea, the parties entered into a joint 
venture and Bonding Assistance Agreement whereby Utah Foam would 
provide bonding as a joint venture with Urethane on the project. As 
a joint venturer, Utah Foam was entitled to share in 33% of the gross 
profits ono the project. (Appellant's Opening Brief, Addendum 2.) 
In order to obtain bonding from Southern American, Utah Foam, its 
individual principals and their wives, and its sister company, Ernest 
Wilson Company, Inc., were required to execute and submit a General 
Indemnity Agreement which both personally guaranteed any liability and 
pledged the assets of Utah Foam, Ernest Wilson Company and their 
individual principals to indemnify and hold Southern American harmless 
against "any and all losses and expenses of whatsoever kind or nature 
. . . which the surety [Southern American] may sustain or incur" as 
a result of issuing the bonds for Urethane. (R. 363-384) 
2 
On March 26, 1991, Southern American issued the required perfor-
mance, labor and material bonds for Urethane to guarantee its 
performance of the contract on the INEL Project. (R. 357, R. 361) 
At the time the bonds were issued, the parties believed that work 
on the INEL job would begin in 1991. The job was delayed for over one 
year solely because of actions taken by the United States Government. 
(R. 392) 
On March 30, 1992, the State of Utah issued notice via Western 
Union Telegraph that it was placing the bonding company, Southern 
American in receivership and that all bonds including the INEL bonds 
were cancelled effective April 25, 1992. (R. 392) 
After notification of the cancellation, Utah Foam, its bonding 
agent, Mr. Westover, and Urethane all took steps to respond to the 
cancellation by attempting to obtain replacement bonds. (R. 3 92) 
Shortly after notice of the bond cancellation and prior to the 
effective date materials for the Urethane contract were received at 
the job site (R. 507-08) and Urethane commenced work on the project. 
Utah Foam continued its efforts to secure the replacement bonding 
through American Bonding. The only items needed to secure the 
replacement bonding was Urethane's cooperation in providing (1) a 
current bank letter updating a similar bank letter that Westover sent 
to Southern American to get the first set of bonds; (2) a letter from 
Urethane's attorney confirming Kendall's statement to Westover that 
Urethane had settled the dispute involving an old judgment that 
reflected adversely on Urethane's credit report; (3) return of a 
simple affidavit form that was to be signed and filled out by 
Arrington verifying Urethane's status and progress on the INEL 
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project. American Bonding was prepared to issue the bonds if Urethane 
supplied these three simple items. (R. 326) 
Urethanefs President, Kendall, communicated with Wilson and 
bonding agent, David Westover, frequently about obtaining replacement 
bonds until shortly after Urethane began construction work on the INEL 
Project. At that time, Kendall ceased communicating with Westover and 
Wilson. (R. 325, R. 343-44) 
Unbeknownst to Utah Foam and in approximately June of 1992, Ed 
Kendall approached Arrington and contrary to the facts, stated that 
Utah Foam was having difficulty obtaining a replacement bond. 
Q: Did there come a time when you decided not to 
require replacement bonds from Urethane Company 
of Utah? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Tell me how that came about and when it was, if 
you can fix the date, a time? 
A: Well, shortly after receiving this cancellation 
of the bond, we received the material. Urethane 
of Utah moved on-site, brought their equipment to 
the job site and their personnel and started 
spraying and appeared that they were capable of 
doing this contract. Their quality was 
excellent. The relationship between Arrington 
and Urethane and the construction manager was 
excellent. The workmanship was excellent, and 
during that time period we started to feel more 
comfortable with them that they could easily 
finish this contract. And their performance 
indicated to us that maybe we didn't need a bond. 
There was also some question about additional 
cost for the bond, whether we should incur that 
cost in view of their actual performance. 
So we tentatively made a decision that we 
probably would not insist on a bond to finish the 
job. They were actually underway and performing 
well. 
Q: Do you know when that decision was made by you? 
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A: it wasnft overnight. It was probably over a time 
period. 
Q: Did you inform Urethane Company of that? 
A: Probably, yes. I think Ed told me he was having 
some difficulty getting replacement bonds, and so 
I said "Well, we're willing to accept your 
performance on this project to continue without 
a bond." 
(R. 508-510, R. 519-520) 
Based upon Kendallfs statement, Urethanefs performance on the job 
and the additional cost of obtaining bonding, Arrington waived the 
requirement of replacement bonds and Urethane was then permitted to 
complete its work on the project without replacement bonds. (R. 383-
94) 
On July 9, 1992, Urethane sent to Utah Foam Check No. 5823 in the 
amount of $38,581.25 as payment for Invoice No. 34299 dated 5/5/92. 
Invoice No. 34299 from Utah Foam to Urethane was for $27,840.45 for 
materials supplied on the INEL job and $10,740.80 to be applied as 
payment under the Bonding Assistance Agreement. (R. 539) 
That Urethane's Check No. 5823 was returned for insufficient 
funds and was ultimately replaced with a cashier's check in the amount 
of $35,000 with the difference of $3,581.25 being charged to 
Urethane's account. (R. 53 9) 
On July 29, 1992, Urethane sent Check No. 44708 as payment on 
Invoice No. 34502 in the amount of $18,965.63. Invoice No. 34502 was 
for $13,390 for materials supplied on the INEL job and $5,575.63 to 
be applied as payment under the Bonding Assistance Agreement. Utah 
Foam returned the $5,575.63 at Kendall's request in order to assist 
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Urethane in making payroll with the understanding that it would be 
repaid from the proceeds on the INEL job. (R. 53 9) 
Utah Foam sent Urethane a letter on August 10, 1992 reflecting 
the application of the funds to the different debts. Urethane did not 
dispute any application of funds under the Bonding Assistance 
Agreement until February 10, 1993, when Utah Foam received a letter 
from Ed Kendall. (R. 539-40) 
As the result of Utah Foam's assistance to Urethane in obtaining 
the original bond for the INEL project, and assisting Urethane in 
finding replacement bonds for over two months, Urethane was able to 
complete the contract and receive the total contract price of 
approximately $550,000. Despite having received all that it bargained 
for and despite the fact that Utah Foam had done everything it 
promised in assisting Urethane to obtain bonding to get and complete 
the project, Urethane refused to pay Utah Foam the agreed upon 33% of 
profits pursuant to the parties agreement. The lower court properly 
found as a matter of law that Utah Foam was entitled to its agreed 
upon share of the profits and entered judgment accordingly. 
In order to further deny Utah Foam its share of profits, Ed 
Kendall, prior to the court entering judgment, set about to render 
Urethane insolvent, filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, and transferred the 
assets of Urethane to a new business operated in the name of his son. 
Due to the lower court's erroneous ruling on Ed Kendall's personal 
guarantee, Ed Kendall has successfully received profits rightfully 
belonging to Utah Foam, has removed those profits from Urethane and 
thereby denied Utah Foam monies to which it is entitled. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
I. Urethane properly argues that the court should give the term 
"all obligations" its fair import and meaning. Applying the fair 
import &nd meaning to the Kendalls personal guarantee of "all 
obligations" of Urethane to Utah Foam results in the Kendalls having 
personally guaranteed Urethane's obligation to Utah Foam under the 
Bonding Assistance Agreement. 
II. Urethane's argument that the Kendalls personal guarantee 
should be disfavored and limited as a type of dragnet clause has been 
rejected by the Utah courts. A personal guarantee is not a dragnet 
clause and will be given force and effect according to its terms. 
III. Both Utah Foam and Urethane treated the Bonding Assistance 
obligation as properly falling under the parties open account. 
Urethane made several progress payments on invoices billed under the 
open account. It was not until seven months after the invoices and 
partial payments that Urethane changed its mind and took a contrary 
position. 
IV. Urethane received the full benefit of its bargain with Utah 
Foam including the bargained for consideration. Utah Foam provided 
Urethane with the requested assistance to obtain bonding as bargained 
for under the agreement. The fact that Urethane negotiated a waiver 
of the need for replacement bonding after the state cancelled the 
earlier bonds does not constitute failure of consideration. Urethane 
received the full benefit of its bargain. 
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V. It would be unfair and inequitable if Urethane were to keep 
Utah Foam's agreed upon share of the gross profits. Utah Foam did all 
it agreed to do and was asked to do by Urethane. Urethane completed 
the job and received everything it bargained for including the 
approximate $250,000 in gross profits. Utah Foam is entitled to its 
agreed upon share of the gross profits in the amount of $65,000. 
VI. The Bonding Assistance Agreement created a joint venture 
between Urethane and Utah Foam. As a joint venturer, Urethane was in 
a fiduciary relationship with Utah Foam and any advantage Urethane was 
able to negotiate with Arrington to waive the need for replacement 
bonds enured to the benefit of the joint venture including Utah Foam. 
I. 
REPLY ARGUMENT ON PERSONAL GUARANTEES 
A. Applying the "Fair Import" of the Terms Used in the 
Guarantee Agreement Can Only Result in a Finding of 
the Kendalls1 Personal Liability, 
Urethane correctly argues in its brief that a court, in 
interpreting a contract, should enforce the "fair import of its 
terms." (Appellees Brief at 7) Urethane proceeds, however, to argue 
in its brief that this court should ignore this enunciated rule of law 
and render an interpretation of the term "all obligations" as stating 
something other than its "fair import." 
The fallacy in Urethane's argument is best illustrated in 
Urethane's own brief at page 8. In attempting to argue that the 
guarantee should not extend beyond obligations arising under the 
credit agreement, Urethane omitted the word "all" in its quote at the 
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bottom of the page. The omission of the word "all" preceding the word 
"obligations" evidences Urethane's attempts to rewrite the terms of 
the guarantee and convince the court that the word "all" is either 
meaningless or non-existent in the agreement. Indeed, without 
omitting the word "all" in its quotation, Urethane could not convince 
even itself of its position. 
The strength of Utah Foam's argument that the personal guarantee 
extended to Urethane's obligation under the Bonding Assistance 
Agreement is best illustrated by correcting Urethane's quotation at 
the bottom of page 8 to properly read, " [T]he guarantee applies to 
x
 [all] obligations of the purchaser,' and continues 'as long as there 
are extensions of credit'". Applying the fair import of the above 
terms can only result in the interpretation that the Kendalls 
guaranteed "all obligations" of Urethane to Utah Foam. 
The cases cited by Urethane in support of their general 
statements of law do not support Urethane's argument that the Kendalls 
should escape personal liability in this case. Indeed, in the cases 
cited by Urethane, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. V. University 
Anclote, Inc., 764 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1985), Bernardi Brothers, Inc. 
v. Great Lakes Distributing, Inc., 712 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1983) and 
Paul Revere Protective Life Insurance Co. V. Weis, 53 5 F. Supp. 3 79 
(E.D. Pa. 1981), the personal guarantors were found liable despite the 
language cited by Urethane. 
The Newton and Rohn cases cited by Urethane are inapposite as 
they are distinguished on the grounds that the obligations at issue 
were not primary obligations of the debtor to which the guarantee ran. 
In those two cases, the court ruled that the guarantees of the wives 
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for their husbands' obligations did not extend to their husbands7 
guarantee of obligations of third parties (i.e., their sons). Those 
facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts in this case and 
neither party has argued that the obligation of Urethane was anything 
other than a primary obligation. 
Clearly, applying the fair import of the term "all obligations" 
such as was done in the two Utah cases of Valley Bank and North Park, 
cited in Utah Foam's initial brief, renders the Kendalls liable 
pursuant to their personal guarantee agreement and the court's 
interpretation otherwise was erroneous. 
B. The Kendalls Personal Guarantee Is Not a "Dragnet Clause". 
Urethane, in its effort to convince the court to unduly limit the 
scope of the personal guarantee, urges the court to treat the personal 
guarantee as a "dragnet clause" in a security agreement. As such, 
Urethane argues that personal guarantees should not be favored by the 
courts. (Urethane's brief at 12) Urethane's reliance upon a dragnet 
clause analysis is misplaced and contrary to the established law of 
Utah. 
A dragnet clause is a provision in a mortgage in which a 
mortgagor gives security for past and future advances as well as 
present indebtedness. Black's Law Dictionary, 443 (5th ed. 1979) The 
case relied upon by Urethane for drawing its dragnet clause analysis 
is North Park Bank of Commerce v. Nichols, 645 P.2d 620 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court in that case specifically rejected the personal 
guarantor's attempts to persuade the court to treat his personal 
guarantee of "any and all obligations" as a dragnet clause. The court 
stated: 
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Neither the First Security Bank case nor the 
Heath Tecna case supports Bottum's [guarantor's] 
position. Neither of those cases dealt with a 
loan guarantee agreement; each included, rather, 
the interpretation of standard printed language 
in a security agreement reciting that the 
collateral secured all present and future debts. 
Id. at 621. 
Further, the court went on to clarify that in neither of the two 
cited cases did the court pronounce future advance clauses as 
unenforceable. Id. at 622. The court went on to find that the 
personal guarantor's agreement "clearly specified his obligation to 
guarantee Nichols present and future obligations to plaintiff." Id. 
at 622. 
Urethane's reliance upon a dragnet clause limitation is misplaced 
and contrary to the law enunciated in North Park. Clearly, had the 
Kendalls wished to limit their liability under the guarantee to only 
the credit agreement as now argued, they could have easily done so by 
placing words of limitation such as "obligations incurred under the 
credit agreement." No such limitations were requested and the lower 
court erred in retrospectively implying such limitations contrary to 
the express terms of the parties agreement. 
C. Urethane's Contention That Utah Foam Never Treated the 
Obligation Under the Bonding Assistance Agreement as Part 
of the Open Account is Inaccurate. 
Urethane goes to great length in its brief to dispute the 
assertion that Utah Foam treated the obligation owing under the 
Bonding Assistance Agreement as part of the open account. Utah Foam 
did treat the obligation under the Bonding Assistance Agreement as due 
and owing under the open account. 
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Utah Foam's president testified that originally he intended to 
treat progress payments as miscellaneous cash (R. 451), however, Utah 
Foam had prepared and sent invoices to Urethane which invoices were 
both for materials purchased and progress payments on the INEL job. 
R. 513-514, 53 9) It was not until over seven months later that 
Urethane disputed the obligation invoiced under the open account. R. 
542) It is interesting to note that Urethane during the performance 
of the INEL contract made two progress payments to Utah Foam on 
invoices under the open account (albeit one of the checks bounced), 
without any protest. It was not until seven months later and after 
Urethane had received the entire profits of approximately $250,000 
that it first decided to advise Utah Foam that it was now contesting 
both Utah Foam's invoices and the obligation itself. 
Urethane's reference to the colloquy in the June 9, 1995 hearing 
regarding the nature of the obligation outstanding as supporting an 
argument that Utah Foam did not consider the Bonding Assistance 
obligation as falling under the open account is factually flawed. 
Prior to the hearing, the court had already entered an order finding 
Urethane liable under the Bonding Assistance Agreement. The issue 
being discussed at the hearing was whether an approximate $10,000 
payment had been properly applied towards materials purchased or had 
been applied towards the Bonding Assistance obligation. Counsel for 
Utah Foam simply clarified that the genesis of the outstanding 
obligation was the $65,000 due under the Bonding Assistance Agreement 
and that Utah Foam was not going to get bogged down as to whether the 
$10,000 payment should have been applied towards materials or the 
bonding obligation. 
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Clearly, Utah Foam intended and did treat the progress payments 
under the Bonding Assistance Agreement as part of the open account. 
Urethane did not contest that characterization until seven months 
later when it decided to keep all the profits to itself. To the 
extent the determination of whether the personal guarantees reach the 
Bonding Assistance obligation rests upon a finding of intent of the 
parties as to whether they treated the obligation as falling under the 
open account, the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Utah 
Foam, would support a finding of intent to treat the obligation as 
encompassed under the open account and the lower court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Urethane on that issue. 
II. 
RESPONSIVE ARGUMENT ON APPELLEES CROSS-APPEAL 
The Lower Court Properly Found Urethane Liable Under the 
Bonding Assistance Agreement 
Despite the fact that Utah Foam performed its obligations under 
the Bonding Assistance Agreement in every respect, Urethane asserts 
by cross-appeal that it had no obligation to pay Utah Foam because it 
was ultimately able to persuade Arrington to waive the requirement for 
a replacement bond. The following facts are critical: 
(1) Urethane approached Utah Foam in the first place 
requesting its assistance in obtaining a bond; 
(2) Urethane needed the bond immediately to avoid having 
its bid rejected and lose the INEL Project to another 
contractor; 
(3) Urethane proposed Utah Foam receive a one-third share 
of gross profits if Utah Foam helped Urethane keep the INEL 
Project by helping Urethane secure a bond; 
(4) Utah Foam and Earnest Wilson Company, Inc, their 
principals and their wives all furnished extensive financial and 
credit information and provided security for Urethanefs 
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Performance Bond by pledging assets; bonds then were issued in 
the face amount of $491,588 for the Performance Bond and in the 
face amount of $491,588 for the Labor and Material Bond; 
(5) Utah Foam, Ernest Wilson Company, Utah Foam's 
principals and their wives all signed General Indemnity 
Agreements pledging their respective corporate and individual 
assets to enable Urethane to obtain the bonding and ensure that 
Urethane get the construction contract; 
(6) Plaintiff, its principals and their wives pledged 
themselves to liability and exposure of up to $983,000 under the 
terms of the General Indemnity Agreement; 
(7) Utah Foamfs assets, and that of its principals, were 
pledged, committed and unavailable for other business purposes 
for approximately one (1) year before Southern American's bond 
was cancelled by the State of Utah. 
Urethane got exactly what it bargained for under the terms of the 
Agreement. Having received and used the benefits of the Agreement, 
Urethane's argument that it should be allowed to escape its obligation 
to pay the one-third share of gross profits promised under the 
Agreement was properly rejected by the court. The mere fact that 
Urethane was somehow able to obtain Arrington's waiver of replacement 
bonds, does not operate as a release of its obligation to pay for Utah 
Foam's assistance in getting the bonds for the contract to perform the 
work on the INEL project. 
A. Urethane received the full value and bargained for 
consideration under the Bonding Assistance Agreement. 
Urethane attempts to mislead the Court into believing that the 
central, underlying purpose of the Bonding Assistance Agreement was 
to provide bonding throughout the course of the INEL construction 
period. However, the written terms of the contract, and the testimony 
of Arrington, Wilson and Kendall unequivocally demonstrate that the 
central purpose of the Bonding Assistance Agreement was not to provide 
bonding for the duration of the construction, but to assist Urethane 
14 
in obtaining a Payment and Performance Bond to keep Arrington from 
hiring another subcontractor to construct the INEL Project. 
The Bonding Assistance Agreement itself provides, in pertinent 
part, that: "As of March 13, 1991, Urethane Co. Of Utah is unable to 
bond this project and has asked Utah Foam Products, Inc. for 
assistance. " (R. 456) The stated purpose of the contract is to 
provide bonding assistance because Urethane was unable to bond the 
project as of March 13, 1991. The uncontraverted testimony reflects 
that: 
1. Arrington was going to look for another subcontractor 
unless Urethane immediately bonded the job. (R. 355-56) 
2. Urethane was unable to bond the job and immediately needed 
Utah Foam's assistance. (R. 456, R. 322) 
3. Kendall told Westover that Urethane would lose the job 
unless they got Utah Foam's assistance. (R. 3 07-08) 
4. Utah Foam performed its obligations under the contract and 
did, in fact, assist Urethane in obtaining a bond. 
After rendering bonding assistance to Urethane in March 1991, 
Utah Foam had no further obligations under the Bonding Assistance 
Agreement unless requested. The mere fact that Urethane did not later 
need bonding assistance after Urethane obtained the waiver in the 
summer of 1992, does not affect Urethane's obligation to pay under the 
Agreement for Utah Foam's bonding assistance in March 1991. 
In Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 
770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988), the Court held that if the language of a 
contract is unambiguous, the court can, as a matter of law, interpret 
the contract, including the contract's definition of the consideration 
supporting the contract. Consideration is an "act or promise, 
bargained for and given in exchange for a promise . . . For the 
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mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to constitute 
the consideration for each other, the promises must be binding on both 
parties . . . Failure of consideration [as opposed to lack of 
consideration] exists 'wherever one is either given or promised to 
give some performance fails without his fault to receive in some 
material respect the agreed exchange for that performance.'" id. At 
91. 
The parties' testimony and the contract language inescapably 
leads to the conclusion that the central purpose of the Bonding 
Assistance Agreement was to assist Urethane in obtaining a bond to 
keep from losing the INEL project. Once Urethane obtained a bond and 
was allowed to begin construction of the project, the material terms 
of the contract were performed and payment under the contract should 
be enforced as a matter of law. Although defendants go into great 
detail about the fact that they did not ultimately need a replacement 
bond, Urethane had already received the full value of Utah Foam's 
bonding assistance: that is, they got a bond and started work on the 
INEL project. 
There is no genuine dispute of fact that Arrington did not waive 
the requirement of a replacement bond until Kendall told him that he 
was having difficulty replacing the bond and after Urethane had 
started construction on the INEL project in the first place. Simply 
stated, the issue of a replacement bond and waiver of the bond is 
immaterial and a red herring.1 
1
 Contrary to defendant's argument, there is absolutely 
nothing in the contract language or testimony that suggests that 
the "very object of the Agreement was defeated" when the bonds were 
cancelled and not replaced. 
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Failure of consideration is an affirmative defense that must be 
established by the defendant. Bentley v. Potter, 647 P. 2d 617 (Utah 
1984) . In the instant case, Urethane received everything it bargained 
for. The fact that the consideration may, in hindsight, be viewed by 
Urethane as worthless or of little value because of an unexpected 
occurrence is not a failure of consideration. Konecko v. Konecko, 330 
P.2d 393 (Cal. App. 1958).2 
Moreover, the defense of failure of consideration cannot be 
allowed where, as here, Urethane implicitly, if not expressly 
orchestrated Arrington's waiver of the requested replacement bond 
requirement. It is well established that a person cannot avoid 
liability for the performance of its obligation by placing such 
obligation beyond his control by his own voluntary act. Cannon v. 
Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977). It is 
abundantly clear that the replacement bond requirement was waived by 
Arrington for a number of reasons including the fact that Kendall told 
Arrington he was having "difficulty" in obtaining a replacement bond 
as well as the additional cost to Arrington, and the fact that 
Urethane was already on the job and performing in a satisfactory 
manner. Under the circumstances, the lower court properly found that 
Urethane would not be allowed to evade payment under the contract when 
it actively participated in obtaining a waiver of a replacement bond. 
2
 An occurrence or contingency which occurs after the time 
of entering the contract must result in a material failure of 
performance by one party. Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker 
Appliance & Furniture Co., supra. See Benson v. Andrews, 292 P.2d 
39 (Cal. App. 1955). The fact that Arrington waived the 
requirement of a replacement bond a year after the contract does 
not constitute a material failure of performance of the Bonding 
Assistance Agreement. 
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B. The lower court agreed that it would be unfair and 
unequitable to allow Urethane to obtain value under the 
contract without paying Utah Foam the agreed upon 
consideration• 
Urethane received everything it bargained for under the Bonding 
Assistance Agreement. Incredibly, Urethane asserts that it would be 
unfair and inequitable for Utah Foam to receive one-third or $65,000 
of the profits in this case when: (1) Ed Kendall is a sophisticated 
businessman who has obtained numerous construction bonds over the 
years; (2) Urethane approached Utah Foam desperately seeking its 
immediate help; and (3) Mr. Kendall himself proposed Utah Foam receive 
one-third of gross profits. This Court should affirm the lower 
court's rejection of Kendall's cynical ploy to escape a payment 
obligation he himself proposed and negotiated at arm's length with 
Utah Foam. 
Indeed, it would be unfair and inequitable for any Court to re-
write the contract between the parties and thereby rob Utah Foam of 
the benefit of its bargain. Utah Foam's bonding assistance made it 
possible for Urethane to keep this $500,000 job. "[I]t is not up to 
the Court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's 
length or to change the bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed 
equitable principles." Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P.2d 
748, 758 (Utah 1982); accord Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 
657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). 
C. Urethane admitted Utah Foam was a joint venture partner and 
the lower Court properly found that any waiver of a 
contract requirement by Arrington would enure to the 
benefit of both the joint venturers. 
In the briefing below, Urethane admitted that the Bonding 
Assistance Agreement was intended and did create a joint venture 
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between Urethane and Utah Foam on the INEL project. (R. 405) The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined the relationship of joint venturers as 
follows: 
[4] The relationship between joint adventurers is 
fiduciary in character, and imposes upon all the 
participants an obligation of loyalty and of the 
utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in their 
dealings with each other with respect to the 
matters pertaining to the enterprise. 
Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464, 468 (Utah 1962). 
It necessarily follows in accordance with Urethane's fiduciary 
relationship with Utah Foam, that any waiver of a replacement bond 
negotiated by Urethane enured to the benefit of the joint venture and 
did not in any way affect the agreed upon sharing of profits as set 
forth in the Bonding Assistance Agreement. 
The lower court was correct in finding that the waiver of the 
replacement bond did not effect Urethane's obligation to pay Utah Foam 
one-third of the gross profits from the project. 
CONCLUSION 
A plain reading of the personal guarantee executed by the 
Kendalls shows that they guaranteed "all obligations" of Urethane to 
Utah Foam. There is no language in the agreement limiting the 
guarantee to only obligations arising under the credit agreement. 
Applying the fair import of the terms used, all obligations, can only 
result in a finding that the Kendalls guaranteed Urethane's obligation 
to Utah Foam under the Bonding Assistance Agreement and the lower 
court erred in granting the Kendalls' motion for summary judgment on 
their personal guarantees. 
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Utah Foam fully performed all its obligations under the Bonding 
Assistance Agreement and Urethane received all that it bargained for 
including the total gross profits of approximately $250,000. Utah 
Foam stood ready, willing and able to assist Urethane in obtaining 
replacement bonds if necessary and Urethane's negotiation of a waiver 
of replacement bonds enured to the benefit of both parties as joint 
venturers. Clearly there was no failure of consideration and the 
lower court's granting of summary judgment on Urethane's obligation 
should be affirmed.
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